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1. Tito's quarrel with the Cominform had its origin in the year 1944 following the liberation of Belgrade. Even at that time Tito was too independent and much too prominent to satisfy the Russians, but they could take no action against him during the war. Tito required Soviet assistance against General Draga Mihailovic and their aid at the Peace Conference. As early as 1944, however, Sreten Zujovic, who is now in prison, supported the Soviets more ardently than he supported Tito. When the open break with the Cominform came in 1948, the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav Army accepted it with regret since Soviet wartime propaganda had deeply influenced the Yugoslav mind. Non-Communist segments of the population, however, had been disillusioned and even alienated by the behavior of the Red Army and the representatives of the USSR in Yugoslavia. Finally the economic recovery of the country had been retarded by ruthless exploitation of all Yugoslav resources for the benefit of the Soviet Union and the other satellites. As a result, the Army and a majority of the Yugoslav Communist Party were compelled to support the break with the Cominform, albeit with regret and with the hope that Tito could discover a favorable solution of the dispute.
2. Now, however, Tito cannot "go to Canossa". Neither can he proclaim a definitive anti-Soviet policy. Although there is no possibility that he can find an amicable solution to Yugoslavia's difficulties with the Cominform, Tito must continue to deceive the Party and Army into believing that he is basically pro-Soviet and will sooner or later settle the dispute. After years of propaganda favoring the USSR and attacking the West, Tito cannot

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execute a volte-face. For this reason Yugoslavia's approach to the Western democracies, although economically her salvation is difficult and full of political risks. Tito does not enjoy this situation, but there is nothing he can do about it.

3. Leading functionaries of the Party and the Army, on the other hand, know that their fate depends upon Tito's ability to extricate them from their difficulties. Tito must constantly remember the pro-Russian turn of mind of many of his collaborators, of whom he cannot rid himself. Alexander Rankovic, for example, is a dangerous individual; the UDB is his personal creation and its officials obey him rather than Tito. Individuals such as Rankovic, Kardelj, Kidric, Bebler and Djilas can never be persuaded to turn their backs completely on the USSR. Since, however, they are doomed to fall if Tito falls, they support him; at all times, nevertheless, they watch to see that Tito does not approach the West too closely, since this would mean their fall without any avenue of escape to the Russians. Such an illogical situation cannot last forever.
4. The present Soviet attitude in the Yugoslav-Austrian dispute over Carinthia is designed to show the people of Yugoslavia that the USSR is not an enemy of their country but only opposes the dictator, Tito, and his supporters. At the present time the Russians hope to overthrow Tito and his gang, regaining control of Yugoslavia for themselves. When they see that this cannot be done, they will drop the Pan-Slav mask and attempt to destroy Yugoslavia itself, making use of the plan of 1934 for the destruction of the Yugoslav state.

The Role of Yugoslavia in a Future War

5. Yugoslavia cannot remain neutral in a future conflict. Should Tito still be in power at the outbreak of war, he will endeavor to preserve Yugoslav neutrality at least for a time. The USSR, however, would not respect Yugoslav neutrality; the Russians would at once invade Yugoslavia in order to dispose of Tito and his supporters, establish a regime oriented toward the Soviets, and put the nation at the disposal of the Soviet war machine. If, on the other hand, Tito should disappear before the outbreak of war, there is no doubt that Yugoslavia will again become a Soviet satellite and will find herself in the vanguard of the Soviet Army.

The Policy of the Soviet Union

6. The Western democracies do not even yet understand the essence of Communism and the aims and tactics of the USSR. Neither the Western democracies nor the various emigres have been able to organize a sound, logical, and efficient propaganda against the real forces of Communism, exploiting at the same time its weak points and the weaknesses of the Communist satellite regimes. The Soviets dream constantly of world revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Knowing perfectly well that Communism cannot be imposed on other nations by peaceful means, the leaders of Communism have no other choice than the use of fraud, lies, deceit, terror, corruption, and ultimately brute force. Moscow has therefore developed an unparalleled

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military organization and an unprecedented policy of imperialism, the purpose of which is the subjugation of neighboring nations, one by one; the next targets will be other nations in Europe and Asia. Africa and South America will follow in their turn. Strong Communist Fifth columns are to be found everywhere and non-Communist personalities in high positions have been corrupted by Soviet agents.

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7. In the war between the Western democracies and the USSR, Europe would shortly be completely occupied by Soviet and satellite forces. When this occurs the Soviet Union would have at its disposal in Europe and Asia unlimited territories with great resources and a tremendous manpower with high industrial efficiency. From such a base, organized by terror and typical Communist methods, the Soviets will be able to resist any outside attack, organizing and launching air and submarine offensives.

Recent Shifts of Personnel in the Soviet Government

8. The substitution of Vishinsky for Molotov represented a change of voices rather than policies. There is no possibility that Vishinsky will introduce any shift of policy vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Whether it be Vishinsky or Molotov who shouts and commands, his activity, attitude, and even his behavior will be prescribed by the Politburo. The character or mentality of the man occupying any given position is of no importance; he is only a gramophone record. This fact constitutes the principal difference between Soviet officials and diplomats and those of the West, who still retain a certain liberty of action and attitude.

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